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Putting a Mine on the Moon: Creating an
International Authority to Regulate
Mining Rights in Outer Space
Jeremy L. Zell*
INTRODUCTION
The second half of the twentieth century will be forever
marked by the United States' and the U.S.S.R.'s race to the
moon -a race that demonstrated to the world that outer space
travel was attainable and realistic. Many feared the peaceful
voyages of discovery would turn toward the militarization of
outer space.2 The threat of cold war brinksmanship introducing
nuclear weapons into space loomed on the political horizon.3
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space Treaty)4 of
* J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2004, University
of South Dakota. The author would like to thank his grandmother, Evelyn; his par-
ents, Jim and Millie; and his brothers, Andy, Eric, and Adam, for their unconditional
love and support. The author would especially like to thank his editors, Meghan
Anzelc and Katherine Clark, and all others who contributed to this article. Respon-
sibility for any errors belongs solely to the author.
1. See generally RIP BULKELEY, THE SPUTNIKS CRISIS AND EARLY UNITED
STATES SPACE POLICY: A CRITIQUE OF THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF SPACE (1991);
RONALD D. HUMBLE, THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMME (1988); CHARLES MURRAY &
CATHERINE BLY Cox, APOLLO: THE RACE TO THE MOON (1989); ALAN SHEPARD &
DEKE SLAYTON, MOON SHOT: THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA'S RACE TO THE MOON
(1994).
2. U.S. Dep't of State, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Narrative, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter Outer Space Treaty Narrative].
3. Id.
4. See id.
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1967 and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Agreement)' of 1979
responded to this threat by attempting to preserve the interna-
tional character of outer space while preventing nations from
conducting military activities beyond the Earth's atmosphere.
Today, a twenty-first century space race is on the verge of
beginning.6 This race will be different in spirit and kind than its
predecessor. It will include new actors. China in particular has
made astonishing strides toward outer space supremacy since
beginning its space program in 1992.7 The new actors will not
be limited to nations. Private firms have begun to see commer-
cial possibilities in the stars.' The first space race was rooted in
cold war politics. 9 Now that the ability of nations to enter space
and conduct activities there has been proven, the new space race
will be grounded in economic principles. Commercial interests
such as tourism and outer space mining will drive private firms
to engage in activities in outer space.10
The mining of Earth's Moon, the planet Mars, and Near
Earth Asteroids (NEAs) holds the potential to be a very lucra-
tive endeavor.11 Scientists believe that silicon on Mars, Helium-
3 on the Moon, and other precious ores such as platinum on
NEAs could sustain information and energy technologies on
Earth for decades or centuries. 2 However, the current legal un-
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Ce-
lestial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34168 (Dec. 5, 1979) [hereinafter
Moon Agreement].
6. The Dawn of a New Space Race?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 14, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4208176.stm (detailing the current space plans
of China, India, and the United States).
7. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
8. Barnaby J. Feder, Talk of Space Turns to Ways to Develop Commercially,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at 18 (reporting the potential for private companies to
retrieve and purify platinum from asteroid impact sites on the moon).
9. See generally MURRAY & COX, supra note 1; SHEPARD & SLAYTON, supra
note 1.
10. See Steven Freeland, Up, Up and... Back: The Emergence of Space Tour-
ism and Its Impact on the International Law of Outer Space, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-3
(2005); April Greene Apking, Note & Comment, The Rush to Develop Space: The Role
of Spacefaring Nations in Forging Environmental Standards for the Use of Celestial
Bodies for Governmental and Private Interests, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
429, 442-45 (2005); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Comment, Moving the Heavens: Lunar Min-
ing and the "Common Heritage of Mankind" in the Moon Treaty, 42 ULCA L. REV.
575, 576-77 (1994).
11. Feder, supra note 8, at 1.18.
12. Id. See generally Yukihiro Yukihiro Tomita et al., Use of Polarized Helium-
3 for the Energy Production, 402 NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS IN PHYSICS
RES. A 421 (1998).
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certainty regarding property rights on the Moon and other celes-
tial bodies limits the possibility of outer space mining. Legal
scholars and nations have hotly debated ambiguous language in
the Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement declaring outer
space to be the "common heritage of mankind."" Until this con-
fusion is resolved, it will be difficult or impossible for firms or
nations to realistically consider the feasibility of mining outer
space, and it will continue to be seen as a science fiction fantasy.
Part I of this Note explores current international space law
by summarizing the developments surrounding the cold war
space race. These developments led to the drafting of the Outer
Space Treaty in the 1960s. 14 Article II of this treaty is no longer
than one sentence, but it specifically prohibits the appropriation
of property in outer space." Further developments led to the
drafting of the Moon Agreement a decade later. 6 The Moon
Agreement explicitly prohibits the appropriation of outer space
property. 7  The Moon Agreement also declares the moon and
other celestial bodies to be the "common heritage of mankind." 8
This language embodies a set of international principles known
collectively as the internationally controversial Common Heri-
tage Concept. 9 The Outer Space Treaty forms the guiding
framework of the law of outer space.2° Later treaties and
agreements, such as the Moon Agreement, expound on its basic
ideas.2'
13. See Carol B. Thompson, International Law of the Sea/Seed: Public Domain
Versus Private Commodity, 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 841, 847-49 (2004) (discussing
.common heritage of mankind" as it is used in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea). See generally Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Com-
mon Heritage of Mankind Principle vs. the "First in Time, First in Right" Rule of
Property Law, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 689 (2004); Hoffstadt, supra note 10.
14. See generally Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
Outer Space Treaty].
15. Id. art. II.
16. See generally Moon Agreement, supra note 5.
17. Id. art. 11, 1 2-3.
18. Id. art. 11, 1.
19. KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 4 n.22 (1998).
20. Scott F. Cooper, Note, The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Does it Create a Moratorium on the Commercial
Exploitation of the Moon's Natural Resources?, 5 J. L. & TECH. 63, 64 (1990).
21. Id. See generally Moon Agreement, supra note 5; Convention on Registra-
tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
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Part I also explores the structure of the International Sea-
bed Authority (ISA)-an international agency created under
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).22 The ISA regulates deep seabed mining in interna-
tional waters-another area referred to as the "common heri-
tage of mankind."2 3 UNCLOS' and the Moon Agreement's at-
tempts to incorporate the Common Heritage Concept makes the
ISA an intriguing model for developing an international agency
to regulate mining in outer space.2 4
Part II of this Note contributes to the current debate by
suggesting a framework for understanding the Common Heri-
tage Concept as it applies to the Moon Agreement.25  The
framework rejects the traditional notion that the Common Heri-
tage Concept prevents appropriation of property." Instead, it
adopts an alternative view that outer space property exists in
common tenancy among the entirety of the international com-
munity.27 Under the suggested framework, the international
community would own interests in the space and lands beyond
Earth and would be free to transfer those interests as it sees
fit.28 The proposed framework for the Common Heritage Con-
cept incorporates elements of positive international law, U.S.
mining law, and the English common law. 29  The framework
seeks to adequately foster private investment in outer space
mining while ensuring that space activities benefit all nations,
regardless of ability to develop resources in outer space. ° Part
II also provides a framework for the creation of a Space Re-
source Authority (SRA) which would be charged with overseeing
mining operations in outer space.31  The idea and suggested
U.N.T.S. 187; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119. Each of these agreements was created
through the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space through
the committee's required consensus process. CARL Q. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 17 (1982).
22. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 156-57, Dec. 10,
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
23. Id. art. 136.
24. See infra notes 111-148 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 168-194 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 75-77, 188-192 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 170-197 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 170-197 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 170-197 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 230-240 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 111-148 and accompanying text. The scope of this Note is
limited to property interests as they relate to outer space mining. Property interests
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workings of the SRA are based in large part on the ISA.32
I. BACKGROUND OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW
A. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE PENDING 21ST CENTURY
SPACE RACE
Beginning with the U.S.S.R.'s launch of the first satellite,
Sputnik 1, 33 in October 1957, the space race developed during a
period of intense political and technological competition between
the two superpowers.34 Many Americans feared the launch so-
lidified the U.S.S.R.'s space dominance.3 5 The U.S. government
was not so convinced. On May 25, 1961, President John F.
Kennedy challenged his country to meet the goal of "landing a
man on the moon and returning him safely to the earth" by the
end of the 1960s.36 Subsequent speeches communicated to the
world that the space race was a race the United States intended
to win.37
The United States became the first nation to land humans
on the Moon on July 20, 1969.38 The United States returned
humans to the Moon five more times between 1969 and 1972.' 9
While the U.S.S.R. never landed a human on the Moon, it did
land several automated probes which collected material from
the surface and returned to Earth.4° It has been estimated that
the United States and the U.S.S.R. combined spent between $31
such as satellite orbits or tourist "destinations" are not discussed.
32. See infra notes 119-157 and accompanying text.
33. BULKELEY, supra note 1, at 3.
34. Id. at 156-82.
35. MURRAY & Cox, supra note 1, at 24.
36. President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Urgent
National Needs, May 25, 1961, http://www.jfldibrary.org/j052561.htm (requesting
appropriations for a plan to explore space that admittedly represented a "course
which will ... carry very heavy costs").
37. See President John F. Kennedy, Address at Rice University on the Nation's
Space Effort, September 12, 1962, http://www.jfklibrary.orgj091262.htm; President
John F. Kennedy, Annual Address to the Congress on the State of the Union, Janu-
ary 11, 1962, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9082.
38. MURRAY & Cox, supra note 1, at 356; SHEPARD & SLAYTON, supra note 1, at
27.
39. GENE KRANZ, FAILURE Is NOT AN OPTION: MISSION CONTROL FROM
MERCURY TO APOLLO 13 AND BEYOND 372, 381 (2000).
40. HUMBLE, supra note 1, at 6-8.
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billion and $37 billion in their endeavors.4
Despite the enormous price tag, the scientific and techno-
logical benefits of the race to the Moon were great. 2 Many mod-
ern civilian technologies resulted from the race to the Moon.43
For example, technology used to remotely monitor a person's
heart rate found its genesis in the need to monitor the Apollo as-
tronauts' vital signs in space.4 A need for stronger, faster com-
puters drove innovation at several technology companies such
as IBM.45
The space race cooled greatly throughout the 1970s and
1980s.46 The two superpowers shifted their focus from exploring
the Moon to developing and employing space stations. 7 In 1972,
President Richard Nixon and Soviet Premier Alexsei Kosygin
signed the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project agreement.4'8 This agree-
ment signaled the first international cooperative agreement be-
tween the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Russian space
station Mir and American space station Skylab signaled the
end-at least temporarily-of efforts to put humans on celestial
bodies.4 9 The U.S.S.R. and the United States continued their co-
operation but separately probed the outer limits of the solar sys-
tem with crafts such as the United States' Galileo" and the
Russian Veneras. 51 The remainder of the twentieth century saw
a steep decline in U.S. interest in outer space.2 This decline oc-
curred in both the public and political realms.53
Today, the international community is witnessing a revi-
41. For cost estimates for America's portion of the space race, see NASA, NASA
HISTORICAL DATA BOOK VOL. II: PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS 1958-1968, at 121 (Linda
Neuman Ezell ed., 1988). For Soviet estimates, see generally JAMES HARFORD,
KOROLEV (1997) (detailing Sergei P. Korolev's role in the Soviet space program).
The United States' investment represented between seven- and nine-tenths of the
combined cost.
42. CHRIS KRAFT, FLIGHT 353-54 (2001) (arguing, in part, that the Apollo pro-
gram had a profoundly beneficial effect on numerous sectors of American and inter-
national economies); Henry Fountain, Retracing One Small Step, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
25, 2005, at 2 (detailing NASA's recent moon announcement and the knowledge gen-
erated from previous exploration).
43. KRAFT, supra note 42, at 353-54.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 192-93.
46. HUMBLE, supra note 1, at 106.
47. Id. at 100-05.
48. Id. at 133-34 n.15.
49. Id. at 92.
50. See ROGER D. LAUNIUS, FRONTIERS OF SPACE EXPLORATION 40-41 (1998).
51. See id. at 31-35.
52. HUMBLE, supra note 1, at 106.
53. MURRAY & Cox, supra note 1, at 448.
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talization of interest in space exploration. 4  In January 2004-
over three decades after the last man touched the Moon-
President Bush announced his intention for the United States to
establish a permanent moon base to be used as a stepping stone
to land humans on Mars.5 In September 2005, NASA an-
nounced that it would place humans on the Moon again by
2018.56 One month later, China sent its second set of astronauts
in two years into outer space. These manned space flights,
coupled with an announced goal of landing an automated craft
on the Moon by 2007, are the first steps in a quest to become the
world's premier power in outer space. 8 The reasons for a re-
newed international interest in space are many, not the least of
which being commercial opportunities in resource and energy
exploitation. 9
B. THE COMMON HERITAGE CONCEPT
It is important to understand the historical underpinnings
of the Common Heritage Concept before one can properly exam-
ine the Moon Agreement and UNCLOS in detail. Maltese Am-
bassador Arvide Pardo introduced the latest incarnation of the
Common Heritage Concept to international law.60 In the infant
stage of discussions that eventually formed UNCLOS, Ambas-
54. BBC NEWS, supra note 6 (detailing the current space plans of China, India,
and the United States).
55. David E. Sanger & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Backs Goal of Flight to
Moon to Establish Base, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2004, at Al; President George W.
Bush, President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration Program, Ad-
dress at NASA Headquarters (Jan. 14, 2004), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2004/01120040114-3.html.
56. Warren E. Leary, NASA Planning Return to Moon Within 13 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at Al. NASA admittedly issued this statement in an attempt
to secure future funding of its programs as conservatives in Washington prepared to
slash government spending in response to the massive amount of federal dollars
needed to rebuild New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Id. at A15.
57. Edward Cody, Chinese Astronauts Return Safely Home, WASH. POST, Oct.
17, 2005, at A12; Chinese Astronauts Land, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at A4.
58. Cody, supra note 57, at A12 ("Wang Yongzhi, the Chinese space program's
chief general designer, told the agency that the low-orbit flight marked an important
step forward in the nation's long-term ambitions for space exploration."); Jim Yardly
& William J. Broad, Heading for the Stars, and Wondering if China Might Reach
Them First, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at A8 (suggesting that Bush's 2004 declara-
tion to send humans to Mars was in response to China's recent space efforts).
59. See Feder, supra note 8, at A18; Mike Lafferty, Destination: Red Planet,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 20, 2004, at 6A (reporting the potential for a "Western-
style land rush" for mineral rights).
60. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 80-81.
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sador Pardo requested the United Nations General Assembly to
declare the deep seabed and its resources the common heritage
of mankind.6" Pardo believed the language would ensure that
developing nations such as his own would enjoy an equal share
of profits generated from the ocean's resources."
The United States introduced the same language to the
Moon Treaty discussions in response to a preliminary draft of
the Moon Agreement that the Soviet Union submitted in 1971.63
Article VIII of the Soviet Draft prohibited nations from laying
claim to surface or subsurface areas on the Moon or other celes-
tial bodies.64 The same article also sought to prohibit the sale or
exchange of property on the Moon.65 The language employed by
the United States was an implicit attempt to create a right to
property in outer space.66 The property rights would convey the
ability to exploit the common resources.
Throughout the drafting of UNCLOS and the Moon Agree-
ment, three camps began to form around the Common Heritage
Concept. 6 The United States put forth the western belief that
the Common Heritage Concept allowed appropriation and ex-
ploitation as long as it was done for peaceful purposes and man-
kind benefited in some way.69 Developing nations argued that
the concept prevented appropriation and required that the prof-
its from exploitation must be distributed among all nations
equally.70 Socialist nations took the middle ground by suggest-
ing that the Common Heritage Concept prevented appropriation
but did not require equal sharing of the benefits of exploita-
tion.71
These divergent views highlight the controversial debate
that has surrounded the Common Heritage Concept since its in-
troduction into modem international law. Understanding the
concept requires a brief examination of its four traditional ele-
ments. Before examining those elements, it is important to un-
derstand that the "common heritage of mankind" is an interna-
61. Id. at xix.
62. Id. at 32.
63. Cooper, supra note 20, at 73.
64. Id. at 72 n.53.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 72-74.
67. See id. at 74.
68. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 161-64.
69. Arthur W. Blaser, Note, The Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space
Law and the Moon in the 1990s, 5 J. L. & TECH. 79, 90-91 (1990).
70. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 165.
71. Id. at 163-64.
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tional concept and not a principle. The term principle is a term
of art in international law. A general principle of international
law is "[a] principle that gives rise to international legal obliga-
,,72 fctions. The fact that several nations disagree on what, if any,
obligations are related to the common heritage of mankind dem-
onstrates how the concept falls short of being a principle. The
term "concept" is more accurate because, as Kemal Baslar ex-
plains, "the word concept is rooted in the Latin word 'conceptus,'
meaning literally collecting, bundling and gathering together.
From a philosophical viewpoint, 'concept' point[s] to a deductive
approach, meaning an abstract notion generalized from particu-
lar instances."' 3
The "common heritage of mankind" as used in UNCLOS
and the Moon Agreement collects, or bundles, four traditional
elements.74 First, the Common Heritage Concept stands for a
75prohibition against the appropriation of territory or resources.
Article 137 of UNCLOS and Article 11 of the Moon Agreement
both explicitly prohibit the appropriation of rights over the sur-
face or subsurface of the respected regulated areas.76 In the case
of the Moon Agreement, this prohibition conforms to similar
language in Article II of the foundational Outer Space Treaty.77
Second, the Common Heritage Concept requires the estab-
lishment of an international authority to manage the regulated
area and its resources.8 Part XI of UNCLOS calls specifically
for the establishment of the ISA.7' The Moon Agreement calls
for the establishment of an international authority once exploi-
tation becomes feasible but does not provide for the form and
function of this authority.
80
Third, the Common Heritage Concept stands for the shar-
ing of benefits among the nations in one form or another.8'
UNCLOS and the Moon Agreement both call for the equitable
sharing of the exploited resources.82 UNCLOS and the Moon
72. BLAcK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (8th ed. 2004). For a more thorough discus-
sion of the superiority of describing the language as a concept, see BASLAR, supra
note 19, at 1-7.
73. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 6.
74. Id. at 82.
75. Id. at 82-83.
76. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 137; Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11.
77. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. II.
78. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 83.
79. UNCLOS, supra note 22, pt. XI.
80. Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11, 5.
81. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 83.
82. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 140; Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11, 1
2006]
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Agreement also suggest a vague balancing test to be used to de-
termine equity. This test would weigh the needs of the develop-
ing world against their contribution to the exploitation of the re-
83
sources.
Finally, the Common Heritage Concept calls for the regu-
lated areas to be reserved for peaceful purposes. 84 Articles 141
and 143 of UNCLOS call for the commercial and scientific ac-
tivities in the deep seabed to be dedicated to peaceful purposes.85
Similarly, Article 3 of the Moon Agreement calls for the Moon to
be "used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses." 6
C. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
During the first space race, the international community
had a strong interest in making sure the race to the Moon did
not become hostile.87 The international community also had an
interest in preserving the international character of outer space.
As a result, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and eighteen other
nations ratified the Outer Space Treaty, which entered into
force on October 10, 1967.88 The fear that either the United
States or the U.S.S.R. would use its newfound space technolo-
gies to militarize space compelled the authoring of the Outer
Space Treaty. 9 In particular, both nations wanted to keep nu-
clear weapons out of outer space.9 ° The Soviets originally sought
to tie the treaty to proposed disarmament agreements between
the two nations but changed their position after the signing of
the Limited Test Ban Treaty.91 In October 1963, the United Na-
tions General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling
for nations to refrain from introducing nuclear weapons into
outer space.92 The resolution eventually compelled the two na-
tions to submit draft treaties that would later form the Outer
7(d).
83. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 140; Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11,
7(d).
84. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 83-84.
85. UNCLOS, supra note 22, arts. 141, 143.
86. Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 3.
87. Outer Space Treaty Narrative, supra note 2.
88. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, n.1.
89. Outer Space Treaty Narrative, supra note 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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Space Treaty.93
The preamble and Article I of the Outer Space Treaty intro-
duced the fundamental notion that carried on throughout sub-
sequent space-related agreements: "[t]he exploration and use of
outer space... shall be carried out for the benefit ... of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development, and shall be the province of all mankind."94 This
idea is also present in Article II of the treaty, which states:
"[oluter space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by
means of use or occupation, or by any other means."95 Article II
is a single sentence, but it stands for a prohibition of laying
claim to private property in space. 9' The prohibition was later
included in the Moon Agreement and UNCLOS both explicitly
and through the Common Heritage Concept.97
D. THE MOON AGREEMENT
The Outer Space Treaty was intended to serve as a set of
foundational elements to be augmented by later agreements.9"
In an attempt to regulate commercial activity in outer space,
nations began submitting working papers to the United Nations
Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Space (UNCOPUS) in the
early 1970s. 99 UNCOPUS opened the Moon Agreement for sig-
nature in the late 1970s and it entered into force in 1984.100 To
date, the United States, Russia, and other influential nations
have not become parties to this treaty.'01 This is due in large
part to the disagreement over the Common Heritage Concept in
Article 11.102
The Moon Agreement, among other things, reaffirmed the
notion that space is the "province of all mankind,"103 expanded
the prohibition against laying claim to private property in
93. Id.
94. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 14, art. I.
95. Id. art. II.
96. Id.
97. UNCLOS, supra note 22, arts. 136-37; Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art.
11.
98. Cooper, supra note 20, at 64.
99. Id. at 71-73.
100. Id. at 77.
101. Moon Agreement, supra note 5.
102. See BAsLAR, supra note 19, at 166-75.
103. Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4.
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104
space, and called for the creation of an "international regime"
to oversee the exploitation of resources in space once such ex-
ploitation becomes feasible.'05
The prohibition against laying claim to private property ap-
plies to the "surface ... [,] the subsurface of the moon [or other
celestial bodies,] ... any part thereof [and] natural resources in
place.""6 It prevents "any State, international intergovernmen-
tal or non-governmental organization, national organization or
non-government entity [and] any natural person" from laying
such claim. °7 This language represents the treaty's first explicit
recognition of private firms as potential actors in space.
The Moon Agreement does not prohibit the international
regime, once in place, from changing this prohibition0  The
agreement states that the main purposes of the regime include:
"(a) [t]he orderly and safe development of the natural resources
of the moon [or other celestial bodies]; (b) [tihe rational man-
agement of those resources; [and] (c) [t]he expansion of opportu-
nities in the use of those resources. " °9 The agreement goes on to
state:
An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing
countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contrib-
uted either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon [or
other celestial bodies], shall be given special consideration.
110
The agreement does not provide criteria for determining
when the international regime becomes necessary. To date, lit-
tle attention has been given to invoking the necessity for the in-
ternational regime.
E. THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY
Establishment of such a regime is not unprecedented. In
1994, amendments to UNCLOS established the ISA to oversee
mining interests in international waters."' The convention
104. Id. art. 11, 3.
105. Id. art. 11, I1 5-7.
106. Id. art. 11, 3 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id. ("The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the international
regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article.").
109. Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11, [ 7.
110. Id.
111. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, G.A. Res. 48/263, Preamble,
U.N. Doc. AfRes/48/263 (July 28, 1994) [hereinafter Part XI Agreement] (agreeing to
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strongly emphasized the need for the authority to maintain deep
seas as the "common heritage of mankind."112
The ISA consists of three bodies: the Assembly, the Council,
and the Secretariat."' Each body is comprised of members
whose salaries are paid by their states of origin."' The Assem-
bly's main functions include, among other things, electing the
Council, assessing contributions, and issuing decisions on the
sharing of revenues to the Authority from mining."5
The Council is the ISA's executive body. It is responsible
for administering the rules and regulations for deep sea mining.
It is composed of four members representing the world's great-
est consumers of minerals,"6 four members representing the na-
tions with the largest investment in deep seabed mining,1" 7 four
members representing the land-based exporters of minerals, in-
cluding at least two developing nations whose mineral exports
have a "substantial bearing upon their economies,""8 six mem-
bers to represent special interests among developing coun-
tries," 9 and the remaining eighteen members to achieve overall
equitable geographic distribution. 20 The Council's functions in-
clude, among other things, the approval of plans of work for ex-
ploration or exploitation of mineral resources and overseeing
compliance with approved plans of work.'2 '
UNCLOS establishes a Legal and Technical Commission, 22
a Finance Committee,' 2 ' and an Economic Planning Commis-
sion 24 as subsidiary organs of the Council. The Legal and Tech-
the implementation of the ISA contemplated in Part XI of the Sea Convention).
112. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 136.
113. Id. art. 158.
114. Id.
115. Id. art. 160.
116. Id. art. 161(1)(a) ("[Flour members from among those States Parties
which.., have either consumed more than 2 per cent of the total world consumption
or have net imports of more than 2 per cent of total world imports of the commodi-
ties produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area... as well
as the largest consumer.").
117. Id. art. 161(1)(b).
118. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 161(1)(c).
119. Id. art. 161(1)(d) ("The special interests to be represented shall include
those of States with large populations, States which are land-locked or geographi-
cally disadvantaged, States which are major importers of the categories of minerals
to be derived from the Area, States which are potential producers of such minerals,
and least developed States.").
120. Id. art. 161(1)(e).
121. Id. art. 162.
122. Id. art. 163.
123. Id. Annex IX.
124. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 163. Similar to the international regime con-
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nical Commission is a fifteen-member body of technical experts
elected by the Council. 125 Its functions range from recommend-
ing approval of plans of work and drafting proposed rules to
monitoring the environmental impact of mining operations.
26
The Finance Committee was created to respond specifically to
the United States' and other industrialized nations' request thatS • 127
UNCLOS more strongly reflect free market principles. The
Committee is comprised of the five largest contributors to the
budget and will continue to be until the ISA becomes cost-
effective.' 2 The Finance Committee must approve by consensus
any decision by the Council or Assembly with budgetary impli-
cations.
29
UNCLOS provides the basic rules by which the ISA governs
mining rights in the deep sea portion of international waters.3 °
UNCLOS divides the activity of mining into three categories:
prospecting, exploration, and exploitation. "Prospecting" is de-
fined as the search for minerals in the seabed.' "Exploration"
is defined as the search for minerals in the seabed with exclu-
sive rights. 2 "Exploitation" is defined as the commercial recov-
ery of minerals in the seabed. 1
3
The convention does not require approval from the ISA be-
fore nations or private entities may prospect the deep seabed for
natural resources,3  but prospecting activities and other forms
of initial investment do not confer any proprietary rights to dis-
covered resources. 35 In addition, nations or firms must obtain
templated in the Moon Agreement, the establishment of this commission is reserved
until commercial deep seabed mining begins. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, §
1(4).
125. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 165.
126. Id. art. 165.
127. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annexes, and the
Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with Annex, "Finance Committee," July 29, 1994,
S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-39 (1994) [hereinafter Status of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea].
128. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, § 9(3).
129. Id. § 3(7).
130. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 153 & Annex III.
131. U.N. International Seabed Authority Assembly, Decision of the Assembly
Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules
in the Area, 6th Sess., 76th mtg. at 2, $ 3(e), Annex, U.N. Doc. ISBAI6/A/18 (July 13,
2000).
132. Id. 3(b).
133. Id. I 3(a).
134. UNCLOS, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 2.
135. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, § 9(3).
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approval from the ISA before they may begin exploration or ex-
ploitation of discovered resources.136 The applicants must sub-
mit a written plan of work that, upon approval, takes the form
of a contract between the applicant and the authority.137  The
application fees for nations or firms who wish to mine resources
in the international seabed are substantial. Article 13, para-
graph II of Annex III requires a $500,000 application fee which
is split between a $250,000 fee for the exploration phase and a
$250,000 fee for the exploitation phase. 3 Applications for ex-
ploration are approved on a first-come, first-served basis.139 The
ISA is required to grant approval of exploration work plans for
fifteen years."' At the end of this period, the applicant must
submit a plan for exploitation.14' An approved plan for work ex-
ploration confers to the contractor a right of priority for an ap-
proved plan for work exploitation.'42 This preference may be
withdrawn for unsatisfactory performance.43
Applicants approved for exploration rights must set aside
reserved areas for possible future use by a body of the ISA called
the "Enterprise.""' The Enterprise may, if feasible, engage in
its own mining operations.4  The application must cover
enough area to sustain two mining operations and the contrac-
tor must divide the area into roughly equal value.
14
Procedures exist to grandfather in nations or private enti-
ties that undertook substantial deep seabed mining activities
prior to the entry of the Sea Convention into force. 47 These na-
tions or entities are known as pioneer investors.148
136. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 153 & Annex III, art. 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. Annex III, art. 6(3).
140. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, § 1(9). If a contractor is unable to suf-
ficiently explore the area within the allotted fifteen years and can demonstrate good
cause for its inability, then the ISA may grant five-year exploration extensions. Id.
141. Id.
142. UNCLOS, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 10.
143. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, § 1(13).
144. UNCLOS, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 8.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Part XI Agreement, supra note 111, § 1(6)(a)(ii).
148. Id.
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II. A FRAMEWORK FOR THE SPACE RESOURCE
AUTHORITY
A. WHY MINE OUTER SPACE?
Discussions surrounding the topic of space mining inevita-
bly lead to one basic question: why would a firm, nation, or the
international community as a whole want to invest the immense
resources needed to mine outer space? There are at least two
answers to that question. First, mining outer space has the
strong potential to yield large returns on investment. These re-
turns take the form of revenue generated from selling the com-
modities derived from mining149 as well as from advances in sci-
ence and technology and the creation of new jobs. 5 ' The latter
returns are what economists commonly call "positive external-
ities." Second, mining outer space has the strong potential to
provide innovative solutions to the international community's
current energy needs. 5
1. Outer Space's Potential to Yield Large Returns on Investment
Firms and nations will not mine outer space unless they be-
lieve that their activities will yield profits. Many gases and
minerals that exist in outer space (e.g., hydrogen, magnesium,
and silicon) also exist on Earth."' The limited introduction of
another source for commodities that exist in current markets
would be beneficial to the market and the firm or nation supply-
ing the commodity. However, introducing another source for
these commodities too quickly would flood the supply and cause
a steep drop in price."4 The drop in price would cause the re-
turn to be significantly smaller than the investment. Rational
producers would theoretically work to ensure the introduction
occurs at an appropriate pace to preserve the market. In fact,
production will likely not begin until the market is ready for in-
troduction of space commodities and firms begin to act accord-
149. See Hoffstadt, supra note 10, at 576.
150. Klaus P. Heiss, Tapping the Wealth of the Moon, 29 J. OF SOC. POL. &
ECON. STUDIES 3, 17-18 (2004).
151. See infra notes 167-173 and accompanying text.
152. See Henry R. Hertzfeld & Frans G. von der Dunk, Bringing Space Law into
the Commercial World: Property Rights Without Sovereignty, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 81,
91-94 (2005).
153. Hoffstadt, supra note 10, at 576.
154. See Heiss, supra note 150, at 59-60.
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ingly."' Earth's resources are finite. Mining outer space pro-
vides an alternative source of resources that will slow the deple-
tion of resources on Earth.
Aside from the revenue that trading outer space commodi-
ties will generate, the second, and perhaps greater, return on
investment is the positive externalities associated with the hu-
man capital needed to develop outer space mining programs.
Outer space exploration in general and mining in particular will
require technology that has not yet been invented and the mod-
ernizing of lessons and technology learned from past space ex-
ploration. 5 6 Vast public and private resources will be needed to
educate a new generation of scientists and engineers."7  The
most direct results will be experienced in the ailing aerospace
industry,""' but ultimately, industries far removed from outer
space mining will benefit from the sharp increase in the number
of jobs that are geared toward innovation.9 The Apollo pro-
gram's investment in American industry yielded similar re-
sults.' Sectors ranging from healthcare to consumer electron-
ics all received an economic boost from the billions of dollars
spent in the quest to send the first humans to the Moon.'
2. Outer Space's Potential to Create Innovative Energy Solutions
Many nations in the international community have begun
to strongly emphasize the need to develop energy solutions that
reduce the world's reliance on fossil fuels. 6 ' Many theories have
been advanced,' 3 and it is possible that the most workable theo-
ries have yet to be conceived. However, the proposed helium-3
fusion reactor is an intriguing thought which deserves some at-
tention.
Helium-3 is a helium isotope that is rare on Earth but is be-
lieved to be abundant on the Moon.6 6 The Apollo program's re-
155. See Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 152, at 93.
156. See Heiss, supra note 150, at 17-19.
157. See id.
158. See id.; Daniel C. Tam, The Business of Space Exploration, 2001 SPACE
TECH. & APPLICATIONS INT'L FORUM 202, 204.
159. See generally Heiss, supra note 150, at 17-19.
160. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. It is beyond the
scope of this Note to explore the totality of energy solutions that exist in outer space.
163. See generally Heiss, supra note 150; Feder, supra note 8.
164. Tomita et al., supra note 12, at 421-22. Mr. Tomita and his colleagues es-
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search on the lunar surface indicated that microwaves could be
used to draw helium-3 out of the Moon's surface.'65 Once re-
moved, the isotope can be used in a fusion reaction that is cheap
to produce, long lasting, and produces nominal amounts of ra-
dioactive waste. 166 One group of physicists theorizes that the to-
tal amount of helium-3 on the Moon could meet the totality of
Earth's energy needs for 500 years.
167
B. INTERPRETING THE COMMON HERITAGE CONCEPT
Before one can contemplate a model for a workable interna-
tional regime to regulate space mining, the concept that space is
the "common heritage of mankind" must be given meaning-
particularly in regard to property rights. The absence of a sta-
ble definition agreed upon by the international community has
led to conflict between industrialized nations and developing na-
tions in the drafting and implementation of UNCLOS.'66
The issues of nonappropriation and benefit sharing are the
primary sources of tension in interpreting the concept. 16 Devel-
oping nations argue that international territories represent
property that belongs to the international community, access
to which should be guaranteed not only to those nations and
firms that are currently able to make use of the resources, but
also to nations and firms that might one day be able to make
use of the resources. 171 In addition, benefits from the exploita-
tion of these resources should be shared equally among the na-
tions without regard to any one nation's investment in the ex-
ploitation process. 17' This position benefits developing nations
because it promotes a system of limited access in which indus-
trialized nations are granted either qualified access to resources
in international territories or are bound to share a portion of
their commercial proceeds with developing nations, or both.
In either scenario, developing nations still reap the benefits of
timate the amount of Helium-3 on the moon to equal 1,000,000 tons. Id. at 424.
165. Heiss, supra note 150, at 34.
166. Tomita et al., supra note 12, at 422.
167. Id. at 424. ("The minable helium-3 on the lunar surface is estimated as
about 10' tons, which corresponds to the amount of the energy demand in all of the
world at the middle of the next century during 500 yr.").
168. See Hoffstadt, supra note 10, at 596-603.
169. Id.
170. Buxton, supra note 13, at 691-93.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the resources through benefit sharing."4
Industrialized, capitalist nations take an unlimited access
view. Under this view, all nations enjoy unlimited access to in-
ternational territories. ' The Common Heritage Concept binds
nations and firms to make the most of what their access grants
them. In other words, if a nation or firm is unable to properly
exploit a resource found in international territories, then that
resource should be left to a nation or firm that is able. 77 This
view is aligned with the "first in time, first in right" view of
ownership.7 8 Industrialized nations promote this view because,
unlike the limited access view of the developing world, unlim-
ited access promotes and rewards private investment.
7 9
The access debate played out in the drafting of UNCLOS.'8°
The first convention, signed in 1982, heavily favored developing
nations.18' The 1994 Amendments shifted favor to the side of
industrialized nations and their firms, which prompted the
United States to finally sign the agreement.'82 Despite the fact
that the United States signed the agreement in 1994 under
President Clinton, UNCLOS went into force in November 1994
without ratification from the United States. The United
States had a provisional right to contribute to the administra-
tion of UNCLOS until 1998 but is now barred from appointing
members to arbitration panels and barred from membership in
the Law of the Sea Tribunal and the Continental Shelf Commis-
sion.184 The mishandling of the Common Heritage Concept de-
bate may have lead to UNCLOS' failure to gain acceptance from
influential nations such as the United States.'81
The establishment of the Space Resource Authority (SRA)
would certainly reenergize the debate but the debate must take
a different form. The true question underlying the meaning of
the Common Heritage Concept is much more basic than the
174. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 185-90.
175. Buxton, supra note 13, at 691-93.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 690.
179. Id. at 691-93.
180. Hoffstadt, supra note 10, at 596-603.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Thompson, supra note 13, at 848-49 (citing The Law of the Sea, 29(2) DEF.
MONITOR 4, 4 (2000), available at http://www.cdi.org/dm/2000/issue2/law-of-
sea.html).
184. Id.
185. Hoffstadt, supra note 10, at 596-603.
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amount of access that should be granted. The question is: who
owns outer space?
The issue of appropriating property in space is at the heart
of this question. Traditionally, the Common Heritage Concept
has been understood to prohibit appropriation in outer space.186
The Outer Space Treaty and Moon Agreement are explicit in
this prohibition. 187 An alternative view is that the Common
Heritage Concept does not prohibit appropriation but instead
prohibits exclusive use.188  This view allows for nations and
firms to appropriate territory and resources in outer space, but
the nations and firms would be accountable to the international
community.89 Therefore the international community would be
able to regulate resource exploitation and ensure its uses benefit
mankind in some way. This view incorporates both the lim-
ited and unlimited access beliefs by allowing for private appro-
priation but giving a voice to the developing world.
Operating under the notion that the Common Heritage
Concept prohibits exclusive use by non-appropriation paves the
way for a workable system of property ownership in outer space.
Through declaring that outer space is the "common heritage of
mankind," the international community effectively laid claim to
the entirety of outer space to be held by the international com-
munity in a form of ownership similar to the English common
law's tenancy in common.' That is to say that every member of
the international community owns an equal and indivisible in-
terest in the property of outer space.' 9' If the international
community decides to transfer parcels of outer space to nations
and firms, it will be through a transfer of property interests
from the international community to the firms or nations.
These property interests could take the form of fee simple,
easements, or other common law property interests. This view
is similar to the prohibition of exclusive use because it allows for
appropriation but provides sufficient opportunity for interna-
186. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
187. Moon Agreement, supra note 5, art. 11, 2; Outer Space Treaty, supra note
14, art. II.
188. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 85.
189. Id. at 91.
190. Id.
191. Tenancy in common is defined as "[a] tenancy by two or more persons, in
equal or unequal undivided shares, each person having an equal right to possess the
whole property but no right of survivorship." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY, supra note
72, at 1506.
192. Id.
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tional oversight.
This meaning of the Common Heritage Concept is also sup-
ported by Article 137 of UNCLOS, which states that "[aill rights
in the resources of the [international deep seabed] are vested in
mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act."'93
In other words, the international community owns the deep sea-
bed, and the ISA takes it upon itself to regulate the use of the
international property.' The remainder of Part II argues that
the adoption of this view is essential to the creation of a worka-
ble SRA.
C. MODEL SPACE RESOURCE AUTHORITY (SRA)
1. Structure and Member Composition
Like the ISA, the SRA should consist of an administrative
body whose responsibilities and authority are divided among
different organs.9' The SRA's Council should be the most pow-
erful body and retain duties identical to the ISA's Council;
namely, implementing the regime through approving and regu-
lating exploration and exploitation working plans.'96 The SRA's
Council membership should mimic that of the ISA's, save that
the SRA Council should not reserve seats for representatives of
the developing world.97 Developing countries would still have
the opportunity to serve on the Council but they should not be
guaranteed a seat. A commonly raised criticism during the
drafting of the Moon Agreement was that the equitable sharing
provisions would be interpreted too harshly against the indus-
trialized world if the developing world was given too much
power.19' The United States was partially concerned with the
implementation of outrageous royalties.' This criticism was
one of the reasons the United States and other industrialized
nations refused to take part in the treaty.200 Limiting develop-
193. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 137 (emphasis added).
194. Contra Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, su-
pra note 127, at 103-39 (emphasizing the right of equal access to the international
deep seabed while not mentioning any significance to the word "vested").
195. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 116-121 and accompanying text.
198. BASLAR, supra note 19, at 173.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 162.
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ing nations' influence on the Council will work to stem similar
fears because the Council, through advice from its Finance
Committee, should be responsible for setting and collecting
permit fees and royalties from outer space mining activities.'
The permit process should be identical to the ISA's. Firms
or nations can prospect for free, but prospecting would convey
no proprietary rights over discovered materials.2 2 After discov-
ering potentially minable materials, a firm or nation would pay
a fee to receive an exploration permit and an additional fee at
the exploitation phase.2 3 The Council would set the amount of
fees a firm must pay.
Once the firm or nation begins commercial mining, the
Council would levy a production royalty on the operations. The
production royalty could be a percentage of the mine's gross pro-
ceeds, net proceeds, overall value of the minable materials, or
some other determination of the mine's value. The royalty proc-
ess is used in U.S. law as a quasi-tax on oil and gas produc-
tion.2 °4
These fees and royalties will serve two purposes. First,
they will work to limit the number and extent of mining opera-
tions in outer space by adding to the high level of capital firms
must invest in starting and maintaining a mine.2 5 Limiting the
number of firms that are capable of mining outer space will ad-
mittedly make it more difficult for the developing world to take
part in outer space mining. However, such a limitation also
prevents the wholesale mining of outer space, thus reducing the
environmental impact. Second, the revenue will be used to
maintain the functions of the SRA.
The SRA should adopt the spirit of the ISA's Enterprise but
alter it significantly. Under the ISA, prospectors who submit
exploration plans of work must reserve enough surface area to
support a second mining operation and reserve half of the value
of the minable materials for extraction by the ISA.2°6 The En-
terprise is the ISA's arm responsible for extracting the reserved
materials.0 7 Under the SRA, firms and nations should remain
201. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 134-135 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
204. See Mineral Lease Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
205. Andrew P. Morris et al., Homesteading Rock: A Defense of Free Access Un-
der the General Mining Law of 1872, 34 ENVTL. L. 745, 752 (2004) (relating the capi-
tal-heavy nature of the mining industry).
206. See supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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responsible for reserving surface area and half the value of mi-
nable materials to the SRA's Enterprise, but the SRA's Enter-
prise should not engage in mining operations. The ISA's Enter-
prise is responsible for mining the areas reserved to it but to
date it has not been formed." If it begins operating, it is in-
tended to contribute to the ISA's self-sufficiency. Some question
the wisdom of leaving the ISA to profit from the operation of
deep seabed mines while simultaneously writing and enforcing
the regulations that govern those operations.2 9 The SRA's En-
terprise should avoid potential conflicts of interest by separating
itself from actually operating mines.
Instead, the SRA's Enterprise should manage the reserved
surface areas and minable materials. It should possess the
power to sell or rent surface and subsurface easements and
ownership interest in reserved minable materials. The proceeds
would then be equitably distributed among non-spacefaring de-
veloping nations as well as used to promote the establishment of
space-related enterprises in the developing world. The SRA's
Enterprise should be substantially, if not exclusively, adminis-
tered by representatives of developing nations, as elected by the
Assembly.
2. Exploitation Easements
Under the ISA, firms that engage in the exploration or ex-
ploitation phase of mining do so through contractual agreements
between the ISA and the firm.21° The exploration contract is
granted for fifteen years. 1' Contractors are granted exploitation
rights based on a number of factors.212 In particular, duration is
determined by "the economic life of the mining project, taking
into consideration such factors as the depletion of the ore, the
useful life of mining equipment and processing facilities and
commercial viability."2 3 The duration of an exploitation con-
tract is meant to be long enough to allow for the construction
and use of commercial mining facilities but short enough to al-
208. Jason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical
Analysis of the Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Author-
ity, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL' 27, 35 (2005).
209. Id. at 64.
210. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 153 & Annex III, art. 3(5).
211. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
212. See UNCLOS, supra note 22, Annex III, art. 17, J 2(b)(iii).
213. Id.
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214low for amendments to the contract when necessary.
The SRA should adopt the fifteen year exploration con-
tract 15 but should not adopt the ISA's exploitation contract sys-
tem.216 Instead, it should grant easements to the surface and
subsurface mining operation to firms that wish to begin the ex-
ploitation phase. Unlike the ISA's exploitation contract, which
has a limited duration to allow for amendments, an easement
would grant exploitation rights to a firm for as long as the firm
maintained a mining facility on the surface and used the sub-
surface to extract material.
This would increase the incentive for nations or private
firms to mine outer space by extending the life of their exploita-
tion operations. Under the ISA's contract system, the bargain-
ing process is heavily slanted toward the ISA. A nation or firm
with an established mining operation stands to lose what theyhaveinvetedin agive .. 217
have invested in a given site. Therefore, it is very important
to the firm or nation that the contract be renewed so that they
do not lose their investment. Under the proposed SRA ease-
ment system, the firm or nation would receive a virtual guaran-
tee that the mine would operate for as long as it was productive.
Thus, the imbalanced bargaining would be removed, making it
safer for firms and nations to invest.
The easements should cover the surface and subsurface but
not the minable materials. The SRA should transfer title over
the minable materials to the firm or nation that seeks to take
the materials to market. This is necessary because a firm or na-
tion cannot sell what they do not own .21  Again, the Council
would set the fees and royalties associated with obtaining the
appropriate easement and ownership rights.219
3. Royalty, Fee, and Minable Material Dedication Forgiveness
The ISA passes a portion of the fees along to developing na-
tions that are incapable of deep seabed mining.220 The SRA
should give no part of the fees and royalties taken from mining
operations to non-spacefaring and/or developing nations. How-
ever, the SRA should forgive some or all of the fees and royalties
214. Id.
215. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
217. Morris et al., supra note 205, at 752.
218. Blaser, supra note 69, at 92.
219. See supra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
220. UNCLOS, supra note 22, art. 82(4).
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in proportion to a firm or nation's investment of its space mining
operations in developing nations. In addition, the SRA should
reduce the amount of the minable materials devoted to the En-
terprise in proportion to a firm or nation's investment in a de-
veloping nation.
Royalty, fee, and minable material dedication forgiveness is
superior to direct payments for two reasons. First, it increases
the chances that industrialized nations will support the system
because it eliminates the direct equity sharing that has made
the Moon Agreement unpopular. 12' A healthy amount of Ameri-
can resistance to the Moon Treaty was focused on developing
nations' belief that the Common Heritage Concept required an
222
equal-or at least equitable-sharing of the Moon's resources.
Many in the west viewed this as a "socialist concept." While
the fear of socialism has declined greatly since the fall of the So-
viet Union, industrialized nations still fear sharing resources
because it reduces the return on their investment and acts as a
disincentive. 224  Elimination of fee and royalty sharing will
eliminate the opportunity for similar criticism of the SRA.
Second, instead of simply making cash payments to devel-
oping nations, the royalty and fee forgiveness program encour-
ages firms and nations to invest in the developing world's infra-
structure. One criticism of the ISA's proposed system of
payment is that there would not be enough money available to
significantly impact developing economies. 22' These payments
could yield some positive results, but direct investment in a de-
veloping nation's infrastructure has a better potential to in-
crease the quality of life in that nation. The firm or nation's in-
vestment will yield jobs directly related to their space activities.
In addition, the firm or nation's investment will increase the
quality of infrastructure related to the space activities. This has
a potential to yield jobs and income ancillary to the space activi-
ties.
As an illustration of the type of investment contemplated,
imagine ACME Space Mining, an imaginary firm based in the
United States. For ACME to mine outer space it needs technol-
ogy to get into space, operate a mine, and return the materials
221. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
223. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 381 (1986).
224. See BASLAR, supra note 19, at 190.
225. See Aaron L. Danzig, A Funny Thing Happened to the Common Heritage on
the Way to the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 655, 664 (1975).
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to Earth for sale. In addition, it needs at least one facility on
Earth through which it can monitor the status of its mining ac-
tivities. In other words, it needs mission control facilities.
ACME may design, build, and launch its equipment into
outer space from one or several industrialized nations. It may
also establish its mission control in an industrialized nation. If
ACME does this, then the standard fees and royalties will be
collected from its mining operations, thus increasing its invest-
ment and reducing its return. However, ACME can elect to
erect all or part of its operations in one or more developing na-
tions. It may decide to assemble its technology in Madagascar
or launch from Panama or station its mission control in the
Solomon Islands. The extent of its investment in developing
countries will determine the extent to which the Authority will
forgive the fees and royalties associated with its mining opera-
tions and/or reduce the amount of the minable materials to be
dedicated to the Enterprise. If the distance between the head-
quarters and the sites in developing nations is too great to jus-
tify investment in developing nations, then the standard roy-
alty, fees, and minable material dedication requirements will
benefit developing nations in ways described below.
D. PROMOTING PRIVATE INVESTMENT
A successful SRA must promote independent investment in
outer space while upholding the core of the Common Heritage
Concept. This is an onerous balance to strike and few, if any,
international agreements have been able to do so.226 The pro-
posed SRA would adequately promote private investment in
outer space in at least four ways.
First, giving meaning to the Common Heritage Principle
provides a stable legal framework, which in turn allows firms
and nations a stable footwork from which to judge the feasibility
of mining outer space. Mining, almost more than any other in-
dustry, is an endeavor which requires a tremendous amount of
initial capital.22v One does not know where to find resources tominewitout irs .2281
mine without first prospecting. Prospecting can encompass
several sites, millions of dollars, and countless hours and still
226. See generally Hoffstadt, supra note 10 (recounting the inability of interna-
tional agreements to adequately incorporate the Common Heritage principle).
227. Morris et al., supra note 205, at 752-55.
228. See id. at 754.
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yield little.2 29 The money and energy spent prospecting is justi-
fied by the belief that sooner or later the prospector will find
success and the prospector will receive an adequate return on
his or her investment.230 This process has been described as
"buying a lottery ticket" because the payoffs are randomly
awarded.23'
It is nearly impossible for a firm or nation to calculate po-
tential returns on investment for mining outer space if the legal
status of its claim is unknown. Currently, the debate over the
Common Heritage Concept leaves many debating whether it is
possible to make claims on materials in space and who receives
the benefits of the extracted material and in what proportions.232
The SRA would resolve this confusion by adapting the Common
Heritage Concept to space and outlining a regime that will regu-
late and appropriate property in space. With an SRA in place,
nations and firms would be able to include property rights in
their cost/benefit analyses. In addition, the current uncertainty
leaves many potential actors hesitant to spend even modest re-
sources exploring the feasibility of space mining.22 The SRA
would eliminate that uncertainty and foster an increase in the
research and development of space mining programs.
Second, the SRA's Council should reserve seats for the
world's largest mineral producers and consumers.234 In this way
the nations and firms with the largest investment in outer space
mining will have a substantial voice in creating the rules that
will regulate outer space mining. This provides an added
amount of stability to the legal framework because it gives in-
dustrialized nations and their firms a hand in their own destiny.
Regulations governing space mining will be promulgated by na-
tions containing the firms with the greatest to gain and lose in
the space mining industry.
Third, the SRA provides methods through which firms or
nations who invest in developing nations can maximize their re-
turn on investment. In the ACME illustration, it is possible for
ACME to receive complete forgiveness of its fee and royalty ob-
ligations with a large enough investment in developing nations.
ACME would then be entitled to the entirety of the return on its
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Hertzfeld & von der Dunk, supra note 152, at 84-86.
233. See id. at 86.
234. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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mining operations. Firms with the resources and willingness to
invest in the developing world stand to make a great deal of
profit under the SRA. This is a strong incentive for private in-
vestment in outer space mining.
Fourth, granting exploitation easements would provide
greater incentive to outer space miners than the contract-based
system of the ISA. Under the contract system, a firm or nation's
control over its operation can only last as long as the contract
allows. As such, those who wish to mine outer space are unable
to know the amount of benefit they may receive from a mine be-
fore the contract expires and they are forced to negotiate new
terms or walk away from their investment. Clearly, the inter-
national authority regulating the mining has the upper hand in
subsequent contract negotiations. Under an easement system,
the firm or nation would be guaranteed use of the surface and
subsurface for as long as it mined at that location. This guaran-
tee creates stability in judging the feasibility of outer space min-
ing by increasing the amount of return an investor can plan to
receive from a mine.
E. BENEFITING NON-SPACEFARING DEVELOPING NATIONS
While sufficiently promoting private investment in space
mining activities, the SRA would also sufficiently adhere to the
Common Heritage Concept. Operating under the notion that
the Common Heritage Concept vests ownership of all outer
space territories in the international community, it becomes
clear that all nations, whether industrialized or developing, are
entitled to benefit from the joint tenancy. However, developing
nations, by definition, lack significant economic capital. The
capital-intensive nature of space travel in general and space
mining in particular renders it highly improbable that a devel-
oping nation would be able to enter outer space, let alone har-
vest its resources. Therefore, adhering to the Common Heritage
Concept requires that developing nations receive some benefit
from the mining activities in outer space.
The SRA would contain two provisions which specifically
seek to share the wealth of outer space with developing nations.
First, the fee and royalty forgiveness program would not only
maximize the return on investment for those who mine outer
space but would also create strong incentives for firms or na-
tions with the ability to mine outer space to invest in the devel-
oping world. More importantly, the investment would come in
the form of moderate- to high-technology jobs. A firm or nation
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cannot establish any enterprise in a developing nation and ex-
pect to reduce fees and royalties owed to the SRA, but instead
must establish an enterprise directly related to their outer space
mining operations.
Without this requirement, a multinational corporation
could invest in any type of activity in a developing nation and
then apply for a reduction in fees or royalties. An example of
this would be a multinational mining operation that mines in
both space and on Earth. If that operation began mining in a
developing country while simultaneously mining on the Moon, it
would qualify for a reduction in fees and royalties. The multina-
tional company would receive a higher return from its outer
space mining while contributing little to the infrastructure or
general well-being of the developing nation in which it began
mining. However, the SRA would require that investment be
tied directly to the firm or nation's mining activities. Like simi-
lar national space programs, the building and launching of outer
space mining technology and the firm or nation's mission control
would require a large amount of high-tech infrastructure 35 and
skilled laborers.238 Therefore, investment in developing coun-
tries would bring with it a level of infrastructure and labor that
could help drive growth in other sectors of that nation's econ-
omy.23 ' The firm or nation taking advantage of the forgiveness
program benefits from a higher rate of return while developing
countries benefit from a higher degree of investment.
Second, the SRA's Enterprise will benefit developing na-
tions by providing a source of income to developing nations and
promoting the development of space-related enterprises in de-
veloping nations. In addition, the Enterprise will provide devel-
oping nations with something they rarely posses: economic lev-
erage that can be used in negotiations with industrialized firms
and nations.
The Enterprise is a good complement to the royalties, fees,
and lode dedication forgiveness program. If the forgiveness pro-
gram is successful, then the amount of area and lode dedicated
to the Enterprise would be minimal, leaving little money to be
divided among nations and given out as grants. If the forgive-
ness program is unsuccessful, then a great number of firms and
235. See T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, COUNTDOWN: A HISTORY OF SPACE FLIGHT 338-
58 (1997) (recounting the cost of American and Russian space endeavors in the
1990s).
236. See Heiss, supra note 150, at 18.
237. See id.
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nations will be required to dedicate surface area and half of the
discovered lode to the Enterprise. This increases the amount of
money the Enterprise can raise through the sale and renting of
surface easements and lode ownership. An unsuccessful for-
giveness program translates into a successful and prosperous
Enterprise, but a successful forgiveness program means a less
prosperous Enterprise. Either way, developing nations enjoy
the benefit of increased investment and infrastructure and/or
direct proceeds from mining operations. In addition to direct
payments to developing nations, the Enterprise's proceeds could
also be used to promote space-related enterprises in developing
nations. This can be done by funding start up enterprises or by
providing grants to firms or nations that want to invest part of
their operations in developing nations but lack the resources.
The notion of non-spacefaring nations selling or renting
property in space is not new. In the late 1980s the Pacific Is-
land nation of Tonga leased and sold off satellite orbits allotted
to it by the International Telegraph Union (ITU).238 At the time
Tonga had been allotted six orbits despite its complete inability
to utilize those slots.239 The unforeseen instance of a nation us-
ing the orbits for purposes other than flying satellites prompted
the ITU to require allotted orbits to be used primarily by the
holder.240 While Tonga's actions were contrary to the ITU's in-
tended use for the orbits, the incident stands as an example of
nations who are capable of space flight and are interested in
purchasing or leasing property rights in space from nations that
are incapable.
CONCLUSION
The time for the formation of a regime to govern the explo-
ration and exploitation of space resources is overdue. Activities
undertaken by the United States, China, and other potentially
space-faring nations represent the beginning of a twenty-first
century space race which will be inextricably tied to mining
rights on the Moon, the planet Mars, and NEAs. By viewing the
territory of outer space as being vested in the international
community, a workable authority to govern mining interests in
space can be established. The Space Resource Authority pro-
238. Buxton, supra note 13, at 703-04.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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posed in this article would create economic incentive for nations
and firms to simultaneously invest in outer space and develop-
ing nations. The hope is that, by eliminating disagreement over
the meaning of the Common Heritage Concept, the international
community can begin to peacefully develop outer space's re-
sources in a way that truly benefits all of humanity.

